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A Mathematical Model Regarding Change in
Preferences of Refugee Settlements
By Ruoxian Huang, Raaghav Malik, and Alice Xu
Abstract. Where cultures meet, there is bound to be conflict to some extent. This especially applies in the case of refugees grouped together when seeking asylum, with different styles of life, socialization, and conflict resolution meeting in one place. This paper
focuses specially on three types of conflict resolution(negotiation, mediation, and arbitration) and constructs a differential equation model to study how the interactions
between populations cause the number of people following each resolution method to
shift. It was found that when there is no existing outside authority or environmental
bias towards a resolution method, the method with the greatest number of followers
will also be the one to take over the final population. However, in the presence of an
outside force promoting or discouraging certain methods, although some groups will
be given advantages over others, the final outcome is also still partially under the influence of the initial population. Outside of stable equilibria representing situations where
one method ends up taking over the entire population, we also found certain unstable
equilibria that carry key information about the basins of attraction of the stable equilibria.

1 Introduction
Refugees are men, women, and children who have crossed borders to seek safety in
another country due to wars, political unrest, etc. Most refugees considered in this
model are ones who cannot return home because of continuous conflict, wars, and
persecution. In fact, globally speaking, there were nearly 26 million refugees by the end
of 2020 [2]. Under these circumstances, it is important to provide refugees with safe and
stable settlements. However, the diverse conditions and preferences of different refugees
complicate this effort. In this paper, we develop a mathematical model that tracks and
predicts refugees’ changing preferences in dispute resolution strategy based on the ratio
of the population of the population preferring each strategy. In other words, we assume
a large population of refugees prefer one of three methods differently in each trial.
Mathematics Subject Classification. 92D95,97M10
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Generally, outside organizations tend to use three different methods to settle conflicts
between groups: negotiation, arbitration, and mediation. In addition to outside interference, refugees from different areas have distinct cultural backgrounds and preferences
for living and seek to incorporate their traditions into the settling process. The clash
of diverse ideas results in disagreements among the refugees, outside organizations,
and others involved in refugee settlements, requiring a solution to address the dissent.
To better understand the issue, we next give the definitions of the three approaches.
Negotiation is the process by which two stakeholders in a conflict or dispute reach a
mutually agreed upon solution through discussion. Mediation is a process in which a
neutral third party helps the parties reach an agreement without making a final decision.
The mediator manages the communication process between the parties fairly, honestly,
and impartially. Arbitration involves an arbitrator, chosen by both interested parties,
who hears the case presented by each party and makes the final decision.
To explore the interaction of these resolution methods, in Section 2 we create and
adjust a mathematical model to represent the population flow. In Section 3, we present
and analyze the results yielded from the models, focusing on the equilibrium points. In
Section 4, we apply the results of the model back into the original context of refugee
settlements in the concluding discussion.

2 Method
To develop our model, we make the three following assumptions. (1) We assume that
all refugees have a preference for either negotiation, mediation, or arbitration, with
none undecided; (2) we also assume that the chance of a refugee switching to a preference linearly depends on the ratio of the population having that preference and the
interpersonal interactions between the two groups of preferences (Theoretically, if the
number of interactions double, the number of refugees that change preferences would
also double, so we used a linear dependence model); (3) there is some outside force
fueling the settlement that may or may not have its own preference, as reflected in the
constants in the model.
2.1 Mathematical model
After setting our assumptions, we proceed to develop an initial model. The three states in
1 represent the preferences of a refugee in the population between mediation, arbitration,
or negotiation. Refugees can switch between groups as their preferences change over
time, guided by interactions with people with other preferences and forceful pushes by
external organizations. Proportionality constants model the rate of movement from a
group to another group. For example, k MA represents the rate of movement from the
mediation group to the arbitration group while k AM represents the rate of movement
from the arbitration group to the mediation group, and likewise for the other constants.
Rose-Hulman Undergrad. Math. J.
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Figure 1: Diagram of population flow, with the coefficients representing the rate of
conversion between groups with different preferences, where N represents the group
preferring negotiation as a conflict resolution method, A represents those preferring
arbitration, and M represents those preferring mediation.
From the diagram in Fig. 1, the following system is developed:
dN
dt

= k AN AN + k MN MN − k NA NA − k NM NM

dA
dt

= k NA NA + k MA MA − k AN AN − k AM AM

dM
dt

= k NM NM + k AM AM − k MN MN − k MA MA.

(2.1)

Here, N represents the number of people with a preference for negotiation, A represents
the number with a preference for arbitration, and M represents the number with a
preference for mediation. The interactions between two groups of people are modeled
by the product of the number of people in those groups: for example, the interactions
between groups A and N are modeled by AN. The instantaneous change in each of the
groups is simply the difference between the people coming in from each of the other
groups and the people leaving to each of the other groups, with the constants controlling
this change. When these equations are summed, these terms cancel out and to get
zero, showing that the net change in the population is zero, validating one of our prior
assumptions.
However, this model does have some weaknesses. Since the constants are fixed,
they determine in which direction people move in the diagram. For example, if k AN
is greater than k NA , there is a net change only from arbitration to negotiation but not
from negotiation to arbitration. This is not realistic; consider a situation in which
almost all members of a population have a preference for arbitration except for a few
favoring negotiation. Then, according to this model, everyone will eventually change
their preference to negotiation. Instead, what happens in the real world is that people
Rose-Hulman Undergrad. Math. J.
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generally yield to peer pressure and a standardized norm or conformity, following the
majority of the population. What should happen in a case where almost all members of
a population have a specific preference is that the population should gradually change
until everyone has that preference. Therefore, the rates of change between the groups
depend on another condition: the draw of the group being moved to. This is represented
by the ratio of the number of people in that group to the entire population. Hence, we
revise the model as follows:
dN
dt

= k AN N
AN + k MN N
MN − k NA PA NA − k NM M
NM
P
P
P

dA
dt

= k NA PA NA + k MA PA MA − k AN N
AN − k AM M
AM
P
P

dM
dt

(2.2)

M
N
A
= k NM M
P NM + k AM P AM − k MN P MN − k MA P MA

where P = N + A + M.
In this new model, the rate of moving from A to N is also proportional to the size of N
relative to the population. This fixes many of the problems of the previous model and
more closely matches real-world behavior. The sum of the three equations is still zero,
meaning the total population does not change. The drawback of this model is that it is
more difficult to analyze due to its complex nature, though we consider in the following
section particular situations where the analysis is possible.

3 Results
3.1 All rate constants are equal
While we cannot directly find solutions to this general revised model, we can analyze the
behavior with various initial conditions and parameter values. In some specific cases,
as shown in Fig. 2a, the initial sizes and parameter values of the three groups are the
same, so the number of people moving out of one group is equal to the number of people
moving in, causing no overall change.
In Fig. 2b, all constants are 0.0002, but N has a slight initial majority with 115 individuals while the other groups have 100 individuals initially. In this case, the negotiation
preference takes the eventual majority, directly as a result of more refugees initially
favoring it.
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(a) N(0) = A(0) = M(0) = 100

5

(b) N(0) = 115 and A(0) = M(0) = 100

Figure 2: Populations movement with the same rate constants (0.0002)

(a) k NA = 0.0003, k NM = 0.0002, k AN = 0.0002, (b) k NA = 0.0004, k NM = 0.0004, k AN = 0.0005,
k AM = 0.0002, k MN = 0.0003, and k MA = 0.0002, k AM = 0.0005, k MN = 0.00025 and k MA = 0.0002,
A(0) = N(0) = M(0) = 100
A(0) = M(0) = 100, N(0) = 150

Figure 3: Populations movement with differing rate constants
3.2 Rate constants are different
Fig. 3a shows a case in which all three states start with 100 individuals and the constants
are k NA = 0.0003, k NM = 0.0002, k AN = 0.0002, k AM = 0.0002, k MN = 0.0003, and k MA =
0.0002. Although the initial values for A, N, and M are all the same, in this case, the
constants determine which group wins out, allowing the arbitration preference to take
the eventual majority. This is analogous to external factors such as non-governmental
organizations directly impacting the change in refugee preferences.
Fig. 3b shows a case in which the initial majority favors negotiation, yet the constants
are chosen such that the eventual majority does not favor negotiation, but instead
mediation. The constants in this case are
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k NA = 0.0004, k NM = 0.0004, k AN = 0.0005, k AM = 0.0005, k MN = 0.00025, and k MA =
0.0002, with 150 individuals favoring negotiation initially while 100 favor arbitration and
mediation initially. The constants here overrule the initial majority since the relatively
low amounts of flow into the negotiation and arbitration states lead to the majority being
the mediation preference by the end.
3.3 Direction fields
To look at the big picture for the dependence of the final result on the initial populations,
we plot direction fields with three different rate constants in Fig. 4.

(a) All constants are set to 0.0002

(b) k NA and k NM are raised to 0.0005 to increase
the negotiation outflow

(c) k AN and k MN are raised to 0.0005 to increase
the negotiation inflow

Figure 4: Direction fields with varying rate constants
In all the rate constants we have explored in Fig. 4, the time series generally approach
one of the stable equilibria (P, 0), (0, P), and (0, 0), which correspond to (N, A, M) = (P, 0, 0),
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(N, A, M) = (0, P, 0), and (N, A, M) = (0, 0, P). In other words, all members of the community eventually come to an agreement for a singular resolution method except in the
extremely rare case of an unstable equilibrium, for if the initial condition is just slightly
outside these central unstable equilibria, the state tends to move towards a stable equilibrium (one of the endpoints of the graph). The basin of attraction for each of the
equilibria depends on the rate constants as shown in Fig. 4, where Region 1 is the basin
of attraction of (P, 0), Region 2 is the basin of attraction of (0, P), and Region 3 is the basin
of attraction of (0, 0).
Figures 4b and 4c with reference to Figure 4a indicate that rate constants do not hold
all of the power in determining the final outcome and show the influence of the initial
population. When the initial population of any given group is sufficiently large, it can
still take over the full population even with a larger outflow than inflow, as exemplified
by Region 1 in Fig. 4b and Regions 2 and 3 in Fig. 4c.
From Fig. 4, we can observe two properties: (1) As inflow increases, the size of the
respective basin increases, and, (2) the unstable equilibrium is at the intersection of all
three basins. That means the equilibrium holds key information about the basins of
attraction, making it useful to know where it is located.
So the important question is: when do these unstable equilibria occur? In Fig. 5, we
plot how the group sizes and unstable equilibrium depend on the constant rates. To take
an example, as k NA increases, a smaller initial population A is needed to take over all of
P.

Figure 5: Movement of the unstable equilibria based on the value of k NA .

4 Conclusion and discussion
Applying the equilibrium points from the model to the original context of the refugees,
it follows that the populations of people preferring either negotiation, arbitration, or
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mediation will each reach a net change of zero when one out of the three takes over the
entire population.
When the coefficients are all equal, this would represent an environment where
none of the methods are particularly favored, making changes based on population
interactions. For such an environment, the number of people belonging to the method
holding the initial majority will approach the total population as time goes on. However,
this will not always be the case, as the environment may have an aversion to or tend to
favor one method over the others. As represented by different rate constants, when the
environment shows some bias for or against a group, both the population size and the
direction of the constants play into which group takes over the entire
To look at the addition of new groups, there are two possible cases. When new
minority groups move into an existing population, they also tend to conform if there is
an existing majority method. If a larger group is to join the population however, their
method will become the dominant one as long as the existing environment is not too
biased.
To take a look at the big picture, refugees in such diverse settlements would likely
end up following the majority when settling disputes unless the initial environment
already strongly favors a certain method or has an aversion to one. In terms of why this
happens, we can adopt an example of where negotiation happens to be the method
heavily favored by the environment. We can expect that as time passes, more and more
of the population will join the negotiation group. This is out of habit and convenience
and will continue until the other two methods die out due to a lack of use and a need
to conform in order to mitigate conflicts. The main goal in all of these settlements is to
maintain a peaceful coexistence even with the presence of diverse groups. Because of
that, conformity to a majority or communally recognized standard is the most rational
solution, and also serves to explain our results.
There are, of course, some limitations to this model, such as our assumption of
all people being open to converting new methods, which is not entirely realistic in a
real-world context.
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